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NOTES

The similarity between our Article 228 and Section 175 of the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure indicates
that we have adopted the most modern and liberal rule on the
subject-a rule providing an intelligible guide to the phrasing
of the indictment, and one which eliminates the obtuse distinctions inherent in the earlier common law rules.
G. D. L.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-RIGHT TO DISCONTINUANCE OR NONSUIT
AFTER PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION-In a petitory action defendants,

without answering the merits of the petition, pleaded ownership
of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten years. At the conclusion of the evidence, but prior to- argument, plaintiffs moved
to discontinue the suit, or dismiss it as of nonsuit on paying costs.
The trial judge refused the motion and gave judgment in favor of
the defendants. Held, the trial judge should have ordered the
plaintiffs' suit discontinued without prejudice to the right of defendant to have final judgment on the plea of prescription.' Rives
v. Starcke, 196 So. 657 (La. 1940).
Plaintiffs' motion to discontinue the suit was predicated upon
Article 4912 which reads: "The plaintiff may, in every stage of
the suit previous to judgment being rendered, discontinue the
suit on paying the costs." This appears to be unambiguous and
to give a plaintiff an absolute right to discontinue his suit. The
difficulty encountered in the application of the article has arisen
through the apparent recognition by the court in particular cases
of certain so-called exceptions3 to the rule enunciated by the
1. The supreme court said that "an affirmance of the judgment for the
defendants on their plea of prescription . . . would have the same effect if
the judge of the district court had ordered the plaintiffs' suit discontinued,
with reservation of the right of the defendants to have final judgment rendered on their plea of prescription." Rives v. Starcke, 196 So. 657, 661 (La.
1940). Consequently, the judgment was affirmed.
2. La. Code of Practice of 1870.
3. In State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 458, 19 So. 256, 257 (1896), the court
collected what were termed the exceptions to Article 491, La. Code of Practice
of 1870:
(1) In Crocker v. Turnstall, 6 Rob. 354 (La. 1884), it was held that after
the introduction of evidence, it was within the sound and legal discretion of
the judge as to the granting of a nonsuit. The existence of such discretion
was denied in State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896), as explained
in Rive& v. Starcke, where it was said, ". . . the court would not have commanded Judge Rost to enter a voluntary nonsuit . . . if the court had concluded that Judge Rost was . . . 'vested with judicial discretion in the
premises.'" (196 So. at 660).
It was also held in this case that Art. 491, La. Code of Practice of 1870,
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article. 4
It is well established in Louisiana jurisprudence that a plaintiff has the unquestioned right to dismiss a claim when it does
not prejudice some legal right of the defendant.5 In cases where
a reconventional demand has been filed prior to the motion to
nonsuit, the motion has been attacked on the theory that the right
which defendant had gained could not be thus defeated. The
court has repeatedly 6 held, however, that plaintiff's right was
nonetheless absolute, "for the motion, so far as it relates to
plaintiff's demand, became effective the moment it was filed, for
plaintiff's demand was under his control;" 7 but "the dismissal can
not be accomplished at plaintiff's instance, so as to affect defendapplied only to discontinuance and not to nonsuit. This distinction has often
been repudiated. Smith v. Gibbon, 6 La. Ann. 684 (1851); Dennistoun v. Rist,
9 La. Ann. 464 (1854); Davis v. Young, 35 La. Ann. 739 (1883); State v. Rost,
48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896); Laenger v. Laenger, 138 La. 532, 70 So.
601 (1915); Cassou v. Robbert, 166 La. 101, 116 So. 714 (1928).
(2) In Succession of Baum, 11 Rob. 314 (La. 1845), it was held that after
seizure under f1. fa. of rights of a plaintiff in an action against a succession,
the plaintiff has no right to discontinue. La. Act 85 of 1928, § 2 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 2149] codified this rule, not limiting it to actions against successions.
(3) In Whittemore v. Watts, 7 Rob. 10, 13 (La. 1844), the court said an
"Intervening party having prayed a dissolution of the injunction [obtained
by the plaintiff] and for interest and damages, was entitled to them and
could not be deprived thereof by the . . . [dismissal of suit] of the plaintiff."
However, this statement is contra to the well settled rule that dismissal of
the main demand carries with it the intervention. Jones v. Lawrence, 4 La.
Ann. 279 (1849); Merritt v. Openheim, 9 La. Ann. 54 (1854); Yale v. Hoopes,
12 La. Ann. 460 (1857); Todd v. Shouse, 14 La. Ann. 426 (1859); Walmsley v.
Whitfield, 24 La. Ann. 258 (1872); Barron v. Jacobs, 38 La. Ann. 370 (1886);
Meyers v. Birotte, 41 La. Ann. 745, 6 So. 607 (1889); Besson v. Mayor, 49 La.
Ann. 273 (1897); Gorman v. Gorman, 158 La. 274, 103 So. 766 (1925); Erskine
v. Gardiner, 162 La. 83, 110 So. 97 (1926); St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v.
Michel, 162 La. 366, 110 So. 617 (1926); Seib v. Cooper, 170 La. 105, 127 So. 380
(1930).
4. Another statutory exception to, or rather limitation on, the operation
of Article 491 is found in Article 532, La. Code of Practice of 1870, which
states:
"The plaintiff, until the moment when the jury shall be about to withdraw, is at liberty, on paying the costs, to discontinue his suit; but if the
plaintiff allow the jury to withdraw, before discontinuing his suit, the verdict
shall be binding on him."
5. Broussard v. Duhomel, 4 La. 367 (1822); Meyers v. Birotte, 41 La. Ann.
745, 6 So. 607 (1889). See also St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel, 162 La.
366, 375, 110 So. 617, 620 (1926).
6. Barrow v. Robichaux, 15 La. Ann. 70 (1860); Davidson v. Executors of
Silliman, 24 La. Ann. 225 (1872); Davis v. Young, 35 La. Ann. 739 (1883);
Thompson v. McCausland, 136 La. 774, 67 So. 826 (1915); State v. Howell, 139
La. 336, 71 So. 529 (1916); Stringfellow v. Nowlin Bros., 157 La. 683, 102 So.
869 (1925); St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel, 162 La. 366, 110 So. 617
(1926); Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931); Parsley v. Parsley,
189 La. 584, 180 So. 417 (1938). See also State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 458, 19
So. 256, 257 (1896).
7. Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 745, 135 So. 225, 226 (1931).
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ant's reconventional demands."8 In other words, the right to such
a dismissal after the filing of a reconventional demand is absolute, but it does not prejudice the defendant's right to prosecute
his demand to judgment. In such case the defendant has in reality
become the plaintiff for the purposes of the reconvention.
Can it be said that a plea of acquisitive prescription is a reconventional demand? It has been said of similar demands that
"they are incidental demands ... and though not so designated,
are properly demands in reconvention." It is the substance of a
demand, rather than the name used, that determines its character.1 Article 37411 defines a reconventional demand as "the
demand which the defendant institutes in consequence of that
which the plaintiff has brought against him. . . ." Here the court
said, the "plea of prescription acquirendi causa . . is something
more than a defense to the suit. . ."12 Nevertheless, the court
refused to decide that defendant's plea of prescription was a demand in reconvention for all purposes, but said that "the analogy
is such that, if the plaintiff in a petitory action discontinues
his suit . . . the discontinuance will not prevent the defendant
from proceeding with the prosecution of his plea to a final judgment. . .. "13
.

The court here denies that the defendant's right to proceed
with his demand in reconvention, despite plaintiff's discontinuance, is an exception to Article 491.14 Rather, it "is merely an
explanation of the effect of the plaintiff's availing himself of his
right under Article 491 of the Code of Practice, and is not an
exception to the rule stated in unqualified terms in the article of
the Code." 15 The right exists but it has only limited effect in this
instance.
Consequently, Article 491 gives to a plaintiff the absolute
right to discontinue his suit or take a nonsuit at any time prior
to judgment 16 being rendered. There is no discretion vested in
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. La. Code of Practice of 1870.
12. Rives v. Starcke, 196 So. 657, 659 (La. 1940).
13. Ibid.
14. The court in Davidson v. Executors of Silliman, 24 La. Ann. 225, 226227 (1872), terms this an "exception or limitation." The latter more nearly
describes it.
15. Rives v. Starcke, 196 So. 657, 660 (La. 1940).
16. In interpreting what is meant by judgment in Article 491, the court
In Wright v. United Gas & Public Service Co., 183 La. 135, 137, 162 So. 825
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the judge, nor any exception save the two statutory ones." The
effect of this nonsuit cannot deprive the defendant of his rights
to prosecute either his demand in reconvention, or whatever the
court may call a defense analogous thereto.
M.M.H.

SUCCESSIONS - COLI ATION - PRESCRIPTION - Plaintiff brought
this suit to obtain collation to the succession of his grandmother.
Defendant, a daughter of the de cujus, filed a plea of prescription of five years under Article 35421 of the Civil Code. Held, Article 3542 deals with the reduction of excessive donations and is
not applicable to collation. As only seven years had elapsed since
plaintiff's emancipation it was not necessary to decide if the prescription of ten years on personal actions2 was properly urged.
Himel v. Connely, 197 So. 424 (La. 1940).

The unanimous opinion of the court stated, "We do not know
of any case in which the prescription of five years was applied
to a suit for collation."3 Several months before this decision, in
the case of Naudon v. Mauvezin,4 this same court had expressly
applied the five year prescription herein urged to an action for
collation. Thus, the Naudon case must be considered as overruled
by the instant case, even though it was apparently overlooked by
the court. It is regrettable that some disposition of the Naudon
case was not made in the opinion. Nevertheless, the decision in
the instant case appears eminently correct.
Until recently there had been virtually no decisions on
the prescription of collation. The Succession of Waterman,5 in
1936, clearly indicated that the action for collation would be pre(1935) said "it is clear that article 491 of the Code of Practice, when read in
connection with its context, related to a judgment on its merits, a final judgment deciding all the points in the controversy between the parties, and not
to an interlocutory judgment, which does not decide on the merits ....
17. See notes 3(2) and 4, supra.
1. Art. 3542, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The following actions are prescribed
by five years:
"That for the nullity or rescission of contracts, testaments or other acts.
"That for the reduction of excessive donations.
"That for the rescission of partitions and guarantee of the portions.
"This prescription only commences against minors after their majority."
2. Art. 3544, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In general, all personal actions,
except those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years."
3. Himel v. Connely, 197 So. 424, 428 (La. 1940).
4. 194 La. 739, 194 So. 766 (1940).
5. 183 La. 1006, 165 So. 182 (1936).

